Wright State University

CORE Scholar
Browse all Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2016

Private Record Linkage: A Comparison of Selected Techniques for
Name Matching
Pawel B. Grzebala
Wright State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons

Repository Citation
Grzebala, Pawel B., "Private Record Linkage: A Comparison of Selected Techniques for Name Matching"
(2016). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 1474.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/1474

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

Private Record Linkage:
A Comparison of Selected
Techniques for Name Matching

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Computer Engineering

By

PAWEL B. GRZEBALA
B.S., Wright State University, 2013

2016
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
April 11th 2016
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Pawel B. Grzebala ENTITLED Private Record Linkage:
A Comparison of Selected Techniques for Name Matching BE ACCEPTED IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
Master of Science in Computer Engineering.

Michelle Cheatham, Ph.D.
Thesis Director

Mateen M. Rizki, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Computer Science and Engineering

Committee on
Final Examination

Michelle Cheatham, Ph.D.

Keke Chen, Ph.D.

Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Ph.D.

Robert E.W. Fyffe, Ph.D.
Vice President for Research and
Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT

Grzebala, Pawel. M.S.C.E. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright
State University, 2016. Private Record Linkage: A Comparison of Selected Techniques
for Name Matching.

The rise of Big Data Analytics has shown the utility of analyzing all aspects of
a problem by bringing together disparate data sets. Efficient and accurate private
record linkage algorithms are necessary to achieve this. However, records are often
linked based on personally identifiable information, and protecting the privacy of individuals is critical. This work contributes to this field by studying an important
component of the private record linkage problem: linking based on names while keeping those names encrypted, both on disk and in memory. We explore the applicability,
accuracy, speed and security of three different primary approaches to this problem
(along with several variations) and compare the results to common name-matching
metrics on unprotected data. While these approaches are not new, this work provides
a thorough analysis on a range of datasets containing systematically introduced flaws
common to name-based data entry, such as typographical errors, optical character
recognition errors, and phonetic errors. Additionally, we evaluate the privacy level
of the q-grams based metrics by simulating the frequency analysis attack that can
occur in case of potential data breaches. We show that, for the use case we are considering, the best choice of string metric are padded q-gram based metrics which can
provide high record linkage accuracy and are resilient to frequency analysis attack
under certain conditions.
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1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation

Data silos, in which organizations keep their data tightly isolated from other systems,
are a major barrier to the effective use of data analytics in many fields. Unfortunately,
when the data in question involves information about people, integrating it often
necessitates querying or joining based on personally identifiable information (PII)
that could be used to explicitly identify an individual. As recent security breaches
at organizations ranging from Target [Yang, Jia L and Jayakumar, Amrita ] to the
United States Postal Service [Sheehan, Brian ] have made clear, it is important to
protect PII, both while it is at rest on a system and when it is read into memory.
The goal of this effort is to explore the applicability, accuracy, speed and security of
existing algorithms for querying and joining databases while keeping the PII within
those databases protected.

1.2

Private Record Linkage

Integrating large volumes of data containing personal information in a privacy preserving manner have been researched for years. In the scientific community this area of
study is known as PRL (Private Record Linkage), PPRL (Privacy-Preserving Record
Linkage), or private information retrieval [Vatsalan et al. 2013]. Linking records with
1
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personal information has numerous applications in diverse areas such as health care,
crime investigation, fraud detection, and statistical studies, to name a few.
The process of integrating databases consists of multiple steps, where the most
crucial ones are: (1) schema matching, (2) record linkage, and (3) data fusion. The
first step is necessary to ensure that all attributes and fields of records have their
corresponding equivalences in all databases to be linked (i.e. the attributes contain
the same type of information in the same format). The goal of the second step is to
identify the records from the databases that correspond to the same entity based on
common attributes. Finally, the last step in the data integration process is responsible
for consolidating the records of the same entity into a single record. The second of
these steps is the one of most interest to PRL researchers, because it is the one most
likely to require the database owners to exchange PII. This step also tends to be the
most difficult, for a number of reasons. An attribute appearing in one database may
not be present in the other one, it may contain error(s), or there may be different
spelling variations of the same value. The parties interested in record linkage cannot
directly share the attribute’s value due to privacy, legal, or business constraints.
The majority of the research in the PRL field operates under the assumption that the
parties are interested only in sharing the information about the intersection of records
of all parties. Examples of such studies are provided in Chapter 2. Some of the work
in the field assumes that neither party should learn anything at all about the records
in the other databases. This kind of approach is desirable when the database is used
to perform data mining or statistical data analysis [Mohammed et al. 2011]. In this
work we focus on a PRL application scenario outside of these research threads.

1.3

Application Scenario

This work focuses particularly on the situation in which a data provider maintains
a database which authorized subscribers are able to query. For instance, consider
a company that maintains a database containing its customer data. The company
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wishes to allow third party entities who have contracted with it to access the information in this database.1 At the same time, the company wants to limit its vulnerability
to data breaches by keeping the data encrypted as much as possible, including while
it is stored in the database and when it is loaded into memory to do query processing.
For instance, if an attacker gets access to the system on which the database resides,
he should not be able to see the raw data values, either on disk or in memory.
Even though this situation occurs frequently, research on private record linkage
tends to focus more on a different use case, in which the data provider and the data
consumer do not fully trust one another. This typically leads to solutions involving
trusted third parties or asymmetric cryptography that go beyond the requirements
of this ubiquitous application scenario, and these additional, unneeded capabilities
negatively impact performance. For instance, because access control mechanisms are
already in place, this work is not concerned about the data consumer (who has paid
to access the information in the database) gaining knowledge of any, or even all, of the
records in the database. Furthermore, this project is not concerned about the data
consumer preventing the data provider from gaining knowledge about what queries
are being made. Rather, the present use case allows a system in which the data
consumer submits a query containing the raw PII values, these values are encrypted
using symmetric key cryptography2 , and the encrypted values are then used to query
the database.
This work focuses on supporting privacy-preserving querying and merging on
string attributes and does not consider numeric data. While private record linkage based on numeric fields of is course an important capability to establish, the
techniques involved for this are distinctly different than for string-based linking. Furthermore, string attributes, in particular person names, are a particularly common
1

A standard access control system to allow authorized consumers to query the database while

preventing unauthorized users from doing so is assumed to be in place.
2
Note that this exposes the raw PII values in memory, though only those in the query, not those
in every database record.
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linkage point between datasets. We therefore leave the challenge of numeric attributes
for future work and focus on name-based linking here. The requirements of our target
application scenario require PRL methods that support encryption and do not need
to act directly on the raw field values, so approaches that utilize the original string
values at any stage in the process are not suitable in this case. Because names are frequently misspelled, mispronounced, or mistyped, it is important for the approach to
support fuzzy (approximate) matching as well as exact matching. This fuzzy matching should be particularly tailored to support the types of lexical variations specific
to names. No data should be decrypted, even in memory, until a match is ensured. In
this paper we analyze the accuracy and efficiency of several metrics that meet these
requirements and compare those results to that of standard name-matching methods
employed on unencrypted data. The paper focuses entirely on technical considerations of the targeted use case. Laws and regulations also have a bearing on this
application, but that aspect is not addressed here due to wide variance between legal
jurisdictions and the authors’ lack of legal expertise.
Note that nothing in this application scenario places any restrictions upon the
infrastructure in which the data records are stored. In particular, the results presented
here can be applied directly, with no modification, to data stored as RDF triples in
accordance with the linked data principles. This work therefore joins a growing body
of literature regarding how linked data can be secured while retaining its utility for
those authorized to access it [Giereth 2005; Muñoz et al. 2012].
The main contributions of this work are:
• The usage of an advanced name matching benchmark generation tool to analyze
the performance of several different name-based similarity metrics in a nuanced
way. In our analysis we consider numerous realistic sources of errors and study
the effect of the threshold value applied to each of the metrics.
• The accuracy of the privacy-preserving similarity metrics is compared to that of
standard string metrics on unprotected data in order to establish the accuracy
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lost in support of data privacy.
• The computational efficiency of the privacy-preserving similarity metrics is also
compared to that of standard string metrics.
• The evaluation of the level of privacy that q-gram based string metrics can provide
in the event of a data breach. In our analysis we attempt to decipher personal
information from an encrypted database using a frequency analysis attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we provide an overview
of some related work and discuss the challenges that make record linkage on names
difficult. Chapter 3 introduces the metrics and algorithms used to perform record
linkage in this study. This includes the string similarity metrics for unencrypted
data which are used as a baseline for comparison purposes and the metrics relevant
to private record linkage. Chapter 4 analyzes and evaluates the performance of the
algorithms mentioned in Chapter 3 in terms of accuracy and computational efficiency.
In this chapter we also describe and evaluate the results of the frequency analysis
attack conducted against a database containing personal information in the form
of encrypted q-grams. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the
results and provides an outlook to future work.

2
Background
2.1

Private Record Linkage Taxonomy

Although all PRL algorithms are designed to achieve the same goal, that is identification of records corresponding to the same entities in a privacy preserving environment,
the approaches that they take differ significantly. In most cases a particular PRL technique has its design dictated by specific requirements of the target application. Such
requirements might include constraints regarding the number of parties involved in
the linkage process, linkage quality, or execution time. Since the requirements almost
always vary from application to application, it is difficult to present the overall outline
of current approaches to PRL due to the lack of standard classification metrics. One
recent survey paper by [Vatsalan et al. 2013] introduced a 15-dimensional taxonomy
that provides a comprehensive overview of major PRL research areas. The taxonomy
is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Private Record Linkage techniques classification
Taxonomy

Privacy
Aspects
- Number of parties

Linkage
Techniques
- Indexing

Theoretical
Analysis
- Scalability

- Scalability

Practical
Aspects
- Implementaion

- Adversary model

- Comparison

- Linkage quality

- Linkage quality

- Datasets

- Privacy techniques

- Classification

- Privacy vulnerabilities

- Privacy

- Application areas
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With respect to this PRL taxonomy, our work can be categorized by the following
characteristics:
• Privacy Aspects: Two parties are involved in the record linkage process (data
publisher and subscriber). We don’t consider any adversary models other than the
third party intercepting the encrypted database. A standard encryption algorithm
(AES) is used to keep the PII secured.
• Linkage techniques: The string similarity metrics evaluated in this work support
approximate matching. We study the effects of applying different threshold values
to the similarity metric results in order to classify records as matches or nonmatches. No indexing technique is used in this work.
• Theoretical Analysis and Evaluation: This work provides information about the
results of record linkage by presenting the accuracy and computational efficiency
of the investigated techniques. We also study the severity of a potential frequency
analysis attack in the event the encrypted database is captured by an attacker.
• Practical Aspects: All record linkage algorithms and the framework used to perform the record linkage were implemented in Java. Synthetic datasets were used to
study the performance of the record linkage techniques. We target a specific type
of applications in which the data publisher allows trusted subscribers complete
access to the data.
The main requirement of our target application is supporting approximate record
linkage while keeping the PII attributes encrypted at all times. Based on the PRL
taxonomy and the requirements of our target application, we are interested in the
PRL techniques that meet the following characteristics. The PRL technique should
require as few parties to perform the record linkage as possible. It should take into
consideration an adversary model in which the attacker might intercept the encrypted
records. Utilization of a private record linkage technique that operates (or could potentially operate) on encrypted record values is also desirable. The linkage technique
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should also support fuzzy matching and preferably threshold based classification rules
that can be adjusted to modify the sensitivity of the PRL techniques. It is difficult
to find PRL algorithms that meet all the requirements of our application. Therefore,
this chapter will provide an overview of relevant existing PRL techniques that at
least partially fulfill those requirements. To support approximate record linkage on
attributes that represent first and last names we also provide an overview of relevant
string similarity metric techniques that will be used in this study. We conclude this
chapter by summarizing common challenges involved in PRL.

2.1.1

Approximate Matching PRL Techniques

The PRL techniques that support approximate record matching can be divided into
those that utilize a third party in order to perform the record linkage operation
and those that do not. In the former approaches, the third party (i.e. middle-man
between the two parties interested in linking their records) is used to prevent either
party from learning the contents of the other’s database other than the matching
records. These PRL techniques are often considered more secure than the two party
protocols [Vatsalan et al. 2013]. The following are selected examples of approaches
that make use of a third party to conduct the record linkage process.
The study presented by [Churches and Christen 2004] is based on using encoded
q-gram lists to calculate similarity between two records which is performed by a third
party. The q-grams in this study were formed from string attributes representing
individual names. To perform the record linkage, each database holder converts the
record’s string attribute into a set of q-grams. Additionally, multiple subsets of the
set of q-grams are also created. All sets of q-grams are encoded using a hash function,
resulting in a list of encoded q-grams sets. Each element in the list contains additional information about the number of q-grams in the set (or the subset) of encoded
q-grams, and a record identifier. Such lists are sent to the third party that calculates
the Dice coefficient between the string attributes based on the information in the
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lists. A threshold value is used to determine whether the two attributes correspond
to the same record. The authors claim that their technique is secure, however they
emphasize that it can still be subject to a frequency analysis attack. Unfortunately,
the effects of different threshold values on record linkage quality were not reported.
The main drawback of this PRL technique is the large communication overhead required to calculate the string similarity coefficients. For example, when linkage was
performed on last names with a threshold value set to 0.7 the communication volume
increased by a factor of 577 (where the baseline was sending raw string values of the
last names).
The approach introduced by [Karakasidis and Verykios 2009] performs record
linkage using encoded values of string attributes produced by the Soundex phonetic
algorithm. The Soundex algorithm and a more detailed description of its use to conduct record linkage in a private manner is described in the next section. The type
of string attributes used in the linkage process in this study include: first name, last
name, and suburb name. Similar to the previous example, a third party is involved to
perform the record linkage operation. Before sending their own records to the third
party, each database holder encodes the aforementioned attributes using the Soundex
algorithm. Additionally, a large number of dummy records with fake Soundex encodings is injected into the databases in order to prevent the third party from discovering
the real size of the original datasets. After the linkage, the third party shares identifiers of records that were evaluated as matches with the two database holders. The
study has shown the proposed technique can be used to conduct high quality linkage
despite the injection of fake records. For instance, even when the databases contained
a fake record ratio of 5 to 1 (for each original record there were 5 fake ones), and the
linkage was performed based on the three attributes, nearly 100% of original records
were correctly classified as matches. Furthermore, the linkage quality does not significantly degrade when the string attributes contain randomly generated mistakes by
inserting, substituting, or deleting one of the string’s characters.
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Another PRL study conducted by [Schnell et al. 2009] proposed a three party
protocol that uses Bloom Filters to calculate the similarity of two encoded strings.
The protocol could easily be modified so that it involves only two parties without
changing the underlying principle of the linkage technique. Bloom Filters are bitarrays that represent the encoded value of a string S as a sequence of 0s and 1s.
To perform the encoding, S is converted to a set that contains all possible q-grams
of S. Each q-gram becomes an input to a set of independent hash functions whose
outputs set corresponding bit values in the array to 1s. To compute the similarity of
the encoded strings using Bloom Filters the Dice coefficient was used. The study has
shown that the similarity values of the encoded strings are close to the similarity values
computed on the raw q-grams. Although some studies have shown that record linkage
utilizing Bloom filters is vulnerable to frequency analysis attacks, it has also been
suggested that the privacy level can be increased by applying several modification to
the protocol [Niedermeyer et al. 2014].
The second type of PRL techniques that support approximate record matching
while maintaining privacy is the one in which the record linkage protocol involves
only the record owners. The algorithms used in these techniques are more complex
than the approaches using the third party in order to prevent the database owners
from fully discovering the content of the other party’s database. Ideally, after the
record linkage protocol is finished, both database owners should have knowledge only
about the identifiers of the records that were classified as matches. The records’
contents are exchanged between the owners over a secure channel after the linkage.
It is often the case that two party approaches have lower communication costs than
the techniques utilizing a third party [Vatsalan et al. 2013]. The following are two
examples of approaches that do not use a third party for record linkage purposes.
In the two-party protocol presented by Vatsalan and his colleagues in [Vatsalan
et al. 2011], two database owners compute similarity values between the records in
their dataset and public reference values. Then, the similarity values are binned into

2.2. RELEVANT STRING SIMILARITY METRICS

11

intervals and the bins are exchanged between the two database owners. Based on
the exchanged bins the protocol uses the reverse triangular inequality of a distance
metric to compute the similarity values of two records without revealing the records
themselves.
Another, somewhat similar, two-party protocol was proposed by Yakout et al. in
[Yakout et al. 2009]. In this approach, each database owner converts all of their records
into vector representations that are later mapped to points in a complex plane. The
planes are then exchanged between the owners in order to identify pairs of points that
are in proximity of each other. To calculate similarity values between the candidate
vectors, the Euclidean distance of two records is computed using a secure distance
computation. The last two approaches are typical of many existing PRL techniques
and, like the majority of those techniques, they implicitly assume that the records
to be linked are not encrypted. A more in-depth review of techniques proposed to
achieve private record linkage can be found in [Christen 2012].
In this work we present a PRL approach that doesn’t utilize a third party for record
linkage purposes, due to the privacy and legal constraints of our target application
model. The record attributes required for the linkage process carry PII information
and it is not desirable to send data containing PII, even in encrypted form, to any
third party. Furthermore, the existing PRL approaches put emphasis on protecting
sensitive data of all of the parties involved in the record linkage process. In our use
case, we consider a situation in which the subscriber submits a query containing the
raw PII values that are later used to query the encrypted database. Additionally,
we are interested in record linkage performed only on string attributes representing
individual first and last names.

2.2

Relevant String Similarity Metrics

A comprehensive overview of several name matching techniques was provided by Snae
in [Snae 2007]. Snae describes four different types of name matching algorithms and
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compares them in terms of accuracy and execution time: spelling analysis based algorithms (Guth and Levenshtein), phonetic based algorithms (Soundex, Metaphonez,
and Phonex), composite algorithms (combination of sound and spelling based methods, e.g. ISG), and hybrid algorithms (combination of phonetic and spelling based
approaches, e.g. LIG). The hybrid algorithms were recommended for many name
based record linkage applications because of their flexibility that allows them to be
easily tuned for specific use cases. However, the results indicated that there is no
single best method for name matching. In the conclusion, the author suggests that
the choice of the name matching algorithm should depend on the specific application
needs. Moreover, this work doesn’t take into consideration the important aspect of
our study, which is linking records while keeping them encrypted.
One important thing to note is that not all string similarity metrics can be applied
to the problem of name-based private record linkage. In order for a metric to be
usable in this scenario, the metric must not require access to individual characters
within this string. This is because any such metric would have to “encrypt” a string
character-by-character, which is essentially a classical substitution cipher that is not
at all secure. This eliminates common metrics such as Levenshtein and Monge Elkan
from consideration.
Among the techniques that support approximate matching for linking records are
the Soundex and q-gram string similarity metrics. The Soundex metric was originally
designed as a phonetic encoding algorithm for indexing names by sound. [Christen
2006] Soundex encodes a string representing a name into a code that consists of the
first letter of the name followed by three digits, by applying a set of transformation
rules to the original name. When two Soundex encodings are compared, the comparison is an exact match rather than approximate comparison but common name
mispronunciations will not cause the algorithm to miss a match1 . To use Soundex
1

In 1990 Lawrence Philips created a phoenetic algorithm called Metaphone that improves upon

Soundex by considering numerous situations in which the pronunication of English words differs from
what would be anticipated based on their spelling [Philips 1990]. Metaphone was not considered
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for private record linkage, both the name and the phonetic encoding are stored in
the database in encrypted form for each record, but the encrypted phonetic encoding
is the one used to respond to queries. The comparison is still an exact rather than
fuzzy comparison, but because it is now being done on a phonetic encoding, common
misspellings or other slight differences will not cause the algorithm to miss matching
records. This was the approach suggested in [Churches and Christen 2004].
Another of the string similarity metrics that can be used is q-grams. A q-gram
is created by splitting a string into a set of substrings of length q. An example of
a q-gram, given q=2 and the input string Alice, is {”Al”, ”li”, ”ic”, ”ce”}. As with
the Soundex approach, in order to use q-grams for name-based private record linkage
additional information must be stored with each record. In the case of q-grams, the
person’s name is divided into q-grams, each of the substrings in the set of q-grams
is encrypted, and those encrypted substrings are also stored as part of the record.
The amount of similarity between two records is then computed as the degree of
overlap between these set of encrypted q-grams for each record. Each individual
substring is compared based on exact match. The degree of overlap is computed
using a traditional set similarity metric such as Jaccard or Dice, which are calculated
as follows:
gramscommon
grams1 + grams2 − gramscommon
2 x gramscommon
Dice =
grams1 + grams2

Jaccard =

, where gramscommon corresponds to the number of q-grams that are common to both
strings, grams1 to the number of q-grams in the first string, and grams2 to the number
of q-grams in the second string. The intuition behind using q-grams to compare two
names is that a typo, misspelling, or other variation will only impact a limited number
of substrings and therefore similar strings will still have a high degree of overlap and
for this effort because the extensions that it makes beyond Soundex are primarily intended to
improve the performance on regular words rather than on names; however, the metric does fit the
requirements for use in this application, and will be considered during our future work on this topic.
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thus a high similarity value. The downside is that the order of the substrings is not
considered, so it is possible for two very different strings, such as “stop” and “post”
to have very high similarity according to this metric.
In this work, we have evaluated the performance of the Soundex and q-gram
algorithms for name-based private record linkage in the scenario described in the introduction. Because it is unrealistic to expect a privacy-preserving record linkage
algorithm to perform better than a linkage method that does not provide any protection for the data, we have compared the performance of Soundex and q-gram to
the performance of some traditional string similarity metrics on unencrypted data.
Specifically, we have used Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler, two of the most commonly
used string similarity metrics, as a baseline. Levenshtein is an edit distance metric. It
simply counts the number of edits (insertions, deletions, or substitutions) that must
be applied to one string in order to transform it into another one. For example, the
Levenshtein distance between ”Michelle” and ”Micheal” is 2. Jaro-Winkler is based
on the Jaro metric, which counts the number of “common” characters of two strings.
Characters are considered common when the difference between their indexes is no
greater than half of the length of the longer string. Jaro also takes into consideration
the number of character transpositions. The Jaro-Winkler version of the algorithm
increases the similarity value returned by Jaro if the two strings begin with the same
sequence of characters and differences appear only in the middle or at the end of
string. [Christen 2012]

2.3

Challenges in Private Record Linkage

Name matching has been researched for many years and numerous studies have proven
that it is not an easy task. This is because a name’s spelling can be malformed in
a wide variety of ways, including punctuation, abbreviation, pronunciation, spelling,
the order of writing, use of prefixes, typos, or optical recognition errors to name a
few. In addition, privacy concerns have made it very difficult to find publicly available
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data that can be used for benchmark purposes, particularly a collection of names that
accurately reflects worldwide name distribution rather than being US-centric. This
lack of suitable benchmarks was a considerable challenge during this study, leading to
the use of a newly-available name matching benchmark generation system, described
in Section 4.

3
Approach
We analyzed the performance of several string similarity metrics for linking encrypted
records. The metrics considered were Soundex and several variations of the q-gram
technique. This performance was compared against that of Jaro and a normalized
version of Levenshtein on the unencrypted data. The data and Java source code are
available from https://github.com/prl-dase-wsu/prl-technique-comparison.

3.1

String Similarity Metrics

We used two metrics based on q-grams. The first is q-grams with q=2 (also called
bigrams). Because studies have shown [Keskustalo et al. 2003] that padding the
input string with a special character (one that never appears as part of any string in
the dataset) at the beginning and the end of string can increase the accuracy when
comparing two different q-grams we also tried padded q-grams with q=2. Both qgrams and padded q-grams were compared using two different similarity coefficient
methods, Jaccard and Dice.
The string metrics that were used on unencrypted data, Jaro and Levestein, were
introduced in Section 2. To formally define both algorithms, the similarity value of
two strings returned by the Jaro algorithm is calculated as follows:
Jaro =

c
s1

+

c
s2

3
16

+

c-t
c
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, where c is the number common characters in both strings, s1 is the length of the
first string, s2 is the length of the second string, and t is the number of transpositions
(the number of common characters that are not in sequence order, divided by 2).
Since all of the metrics used in this study return a value between 0.0 (when strings
are completely different) and 1.0 (when string are the same) we modified the original
Levenshtein algorithm so that it returns a similarity value that falls in the same range.
The Normalized Levenshtein formula is defined as follows:
NormalizedLevenshtein = 1 −

Levenshtein
max(s1 ,s2 )

, where Levenshtein is the number of replacements needed to transform the first string
into the second string, s1 is the length of the first string, and s2 is the length of the
second string.

3.2

Benchmark Datasets

The benchmark datasets used in this study were created by using the advanced personal data generation tool called “GeCo” and developed by K-N. Tran et al. [Tran
et al. 2013] The tool was created to address the issue of lack of publicly available data
that contains PII information. GeCo has two main functionalities: data generation
and data corruption. The data generation module provides the user with an interface
capable of producing records with five different attribute generation mechanisms. The
first two can be used to generate individual attributes such as credit card number,
social security number, name, age, etc. The attribute values are created by either
user-defined functions or based on frequency look-up files that specify the set of all
possible values of an attribute and their relative frequencies. The other three types
of attribute generation mechanisms allow the user to produce compound attributes
where the attributes’ values depend on each other. For example, a compound attribute with fields such as: city, gender, and blood pressure can be created, where
the value of the blood pressure depends on the previously generated city and gender
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values. The second module of GeCo provides users with a sophisticated interface
allowing them to corrupt the generated data using six different corruption techniques
that simulate real-world errors that can occur during data processing. Those techniques include introducing: (1) missing values (one of the record’s fields gets lost), (2)
character edits (a random character of a string attribute is inserted, deleted, substituted, or transposed), (3) keyboard edits (simulates a human mistake during typing),
(4) optical character recognition (OCR) errors (simulates OCR software mistakes),
(5) phonetic edits (replaces substrings with their corresponding phonetic variations),
and (6) categorical value swapping (replaces an attribute value with one of its possible variations). The user can also specify numerous other parameters such as: the
number of records to corrupt, the number of corruptions applied to a record or single
attribute, or the probability of corruption of a particular attribute.
For benchmark purposes we generated a dataset of 10,000 records where each of the
records had the following attributes: first name, last name and credit card number.
Then, we used the GeCo tool to introduce various types of realistic corruption to
the generated dataset. The corrupted datasets produced by the GeCo tool were
categorized using three parameters: type of applied corruption technique (Character
Edit, Keyboard Edit, OCR Edit, Phonetic Edit, or mix of all), the percentage of
original record corruption (high - 10%, medium - 5%. or low - 2%), and the number of
corruptions applied to either the first name, last name, or both (1 or 2). This resulted
in 30 variations of the dataset. Once the datasets were corrupted we added additional
attributes containing encrypted versions of the q-grams and Soundex encodings of the
first and last name to each of the records from all datasets to be able to perform record
linkage using the encrypted values. Each q-gram array and Soundex encoding were
encrypted using 256-bit AES password-based encryption.
To evaluate the performance of the string metrics, the uncorrupted dataset was
cross joined with each of the corrupted datasets using each of the string metrics
discussed in the previous section. During the join operation only the pairs of records
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with the highest similarity score that exceeded a threshold value were joined. If
the a pair of joined records corresponded to the same individual we counted it as a
”Correct” join, otherwise the join was counted as a ”False Positive”. If none of the
scores returned by a string metric exceeded a threshold value we incremented the
”False Negative” count by 1 to indicate that a corresponding record was not found
in the other dataset. In a special case, when more than one pair of records had the
same highest score, the pair of records that corresponded to the same individual was
marked as ”Correct” and the rest of the pairs were counted as ”False Positive”.

4
Evaluation and Analysis
4.1

Observations on String Metric Comparison

Performing record linkage using each of the seven string metrics (q-grams compared
using Jaccard coefficient, q-grams compared using Dice coefficient, padded q-grams
compared using Jaccard coefficient, padded q-grams compared using Dice coefficient,
Soundex, Levenshtein, and Jaro) between the uncorrupted dataset and the 30 corrupted datasets resulted in a massive amount of statistical data. Instead of presenting
the outcome of every single cross join operation, this section summarizes our key findings, with an emphasis on practical advice related to selecting a metric, setting the
threshold, and conveying the type of performance that can be expected by someone
attempting to do name-based private record linkage.

4.1.1

Observation 1: Soundex is not viable, but (padded)
q -grams are

Figure 4.1 shows the results of all of the string metrics on a version of the data in
which 10 percent of the names have had one (the solid lines) or two (the dotten lines)
characters edited. In the single edit case, all versions of the q-gram metric are able
to achieve the same, nearly perfect, accuracy on the encrypted data that Levenshtein
and Jaro achieve on the unencrypted data. The performance of all metrics is lower
20
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for the two character edit case, with a top accuracy of 90 percent rather than the
completely accurate results possible in the single edit situation. However, we again
see that the performance of at least the padded versions of the q-gram approach on
the ciphertext can match that of Levenshtein and Jaro on the plaintext.
Figure 4.1: Illustration accuracy of record linkage of selected string metrics as a
function of threshold. Solid lines correspond to accuracy when linkage was performed
on datasets corrupted with 1 Character Edit, dotted lines with 2 Character Edits.
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The results for the Soundex metric are not included in Figure 4.1 because the
results showed that comparing names based on encrypted Soundex encodings is not
viable in most of the cases as a record linkage technique. The only exception was noted
when the datasets containing records with the phonetic type of record corruption were
joined. Still, in the best case scenario only 60.71% of corrupted data was successfully
matched using this technique. Table 4.1 presents the accuracy of record linkage on
all types of corrupted datasets using the Soundex technique.
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Table 4.1: Performance of record linkage based on encrypted Soundex encodings.
The percentage values reflect the number of corrupted records that were successfully
matched with their uncorrupted versions.
Number of corruptions per record
Corruption type

4.1.2

1

2

Character Edit

47.24%

24.06%

Keyboard Edit

48.06%

21.94%

OCR Edit

38.29%

13.71%

Phonetic Edit

60.71%

43.88%

Mix

50.82%

25.47%

Observation 2: Dice is preferable to Jaccard for calculating q -gram similarity

Out of the four similarity metrics based on q-grams, the ones using the Dice coefficient
to measure the similarity between the sets of encrypted q-grams were more accurate.
This was the case with q-grams as well as padded q-grams. This can be explained
by the fact that Dice favors the occurrences of common q-grams more than Jaccard.
As a result, a pair of similar records is likely to have a higher similarity score when
calculated using the Dice coefficient. To illustrate this, in Table 4.2 we provide a
sample of results from record linkage performed against a dataset with the phonetic
type of corruption, where 10% of original records had two phonetic errors introduced.
Similar results were recorded for datasets with other types of corruptions.

4.1.3

Observation 3: Lower thresholds are better for q -grams

Figure 4.1 illustrates that the threshold value for the Levenshtein and Jaro metrics can
be set relatively high without sacrificing accuracy when linking the unencrypted data,
which was not the case when the q-gram techniques were used to link the encrypted
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Table 4.2: Sample results of record linkage performed against phonetically corrupted
dataset showing the performance of q-grams based string similarity metrics
unpadded q-grams
Jaccard

padded q-grams

Dice

Threshold

Correct

FP

FN

Correct FP

0.30

9837

60

163

9837

0.35

9837

60

163

0.40

9834

57

0.45

9814

0.50

Jaccard

Dice

FN

Correct

FP

FN

Correct

FP

FN

60

163

9949

45

51

9949

45

51

9837

60

163

9949

45

51

9949

45

51

166

9837

60

163

9948

45

52

9949

45

51

56

186

9837

60

163

9937

43

63

9949

45

51

9778

48

222

9837

60

163

9910

38

90

9949

45

51

0.55

9614

29

386

9834

57

166

9790

27

210

9949

45

51

0.60

9506

25

494

9826

57

174

9589

18

411

9946

45

54

0.65

9329

21

671

9778

48

222

9337

18

661

9910

38

90

0.70

9198

18

802

9637

32

363

9170

18

830

9792

27

208

0.75

9101

18

899

9467

22

532

9081

17

919

9538

18

462

0.80

9046

18

954

9264

19

736

9032

17

968

9233

18

767

0.85

9023

18

977

9125

18

875

9011

17

989

9097

17

903

0.90

9009

18

991

9036

18

964

9002

17

998

9021

17

979

0.95

9002

18

998

9009

18

991

9000

17

1000

9002

17

998

data. For instance, to achieve an accuracy of 99.5% when performing linkage against
datasets where records contain one corruption of any type, the threshold value applied
to the Jaro or Levenshtein metric was set to 0.8 whereas the threshold value applied
to q-grams based metrics needs to be set to a value between 0.55 and 0.75 to achieve
the same result, depending on the type of corruption applied to the datasets.
Table 4.2 makes the point that the padded versions of the q-gram metric in particular have better performance when the threshold value is kept low, which as explained
in the previous paragraph is the optimal approach. For threshold values up to 0.7 for
the Jaccard coefficient and 0.8 for the Dice coefficient, padding the q-grams produces
better results. For higher threshold values, the unpadded version is slightly better.
The reason behind this is that similarity scores calculated using padded q-grams are
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higher when the differences between the strings used to generate the q-grams appear
in the middle of the strings. [Christen 2012] When the differences appear at the
beginning or at the end of strings the similarity scores are lower because the number
of common q-grams is smaller. Statistically, the differences between strings appear
more often in the middle, which explains why the padded q-grams can produce higher
similarity scores for the majority of corrupted data. This pattern occurred in all of
the results produced during this study.

4.1.4

Observation 4: Some types of errors are worse than
others

Out of all corrupted datasets the worst performance in terms of accuracy and the
number of false positives found was “achieved” when the datasets with OCR Edits
were linked. This is most likely due to the fact that some of the mistakes that OCR
Edits introduce are replacements of two characters in place of one character, or vice
versa. For instance, character “m” can be replaced with “rn” and the string “cl” can
be replaced by the character “d”. Those kind of replacements can have a significant
negative impact on the string similarity scores produced by all of the metrics. The best
performance results were recorded when the datasets corrupted with Character Edits
were linked, those are presented in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 illustrates the accuracies
of linking datasets corrupted with OCR Edits errors. The accuracies of datasets
corrupted with Keyboard Edits, Phonetic Edits, and a mix of all types of edits fall
in between the accuracies presented in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
Another pattern common for the results obtained from linking all types of corrupted datasets was a significant drop in accuracy when the corrupted records contained more than one error of any type. For instance, for Threshold =0.85 the accuracies of the Jaro, Levenshtein, unpadded q-grams compared using the Dice coefficient,
and padded q-grams compared using the Dice coefficient were 97.5%, 90.79%, 57.46%,
and 73.37% respectively when there was only one error of the Character Edit type
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Figure 4.2: Accuracy of string metrics used to perform record linkage on a dataset
with 10% of the records corrupted using OCR Edits with 1 corruption per record.
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per record. When the number of errors per corrupted record increased to two, the
accuracies decreased to 88.39%, 39.54%, 13.31%, and 10.41%. Figure 4.1 presents a
full overview of the accuracy degradation for datasets corrupted with Character Edits
where 10% of all original records were corrupted.

4.1.5

Observation 5: The efficiency penalty for these privacypreserving string similarity metrics is small

The Jaro, Levenshtein, and Jaccard and Dice variants of the q-grams metric all
have a O(nm) time complexity, where n and m are the lengths of the strings to be
compared. Because the Soundex metric is only checking for equality of the Soundex
representation of the strings, its time complexity is just O(n). When determining
whether a particular name is in the dataset, the query name is compared against all
of the names in the dataset. It should be noted that the Soundex algorithm, because
it is an exact rather than fuzzy match, could be made more efficient by indexing the
database on the Soundex representation of the name. Also, there has been some work
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on eliminating the need to consider all names in the dataset when querying using the
Jaro metric through the user of character and length-based filters to quickly determine
if it is possible for a particular name to match the query within a specified threshold
[Dreßler and Ngomo 2014]. Neither of these optimizations were considered in this
work.
While most of the string metrics considered have the same computational complexity, constant factors differ between the approaches. For example, because Jaro
only looks for matching characters within a window that is half the length of the
longer string, it is generally faster than Levenshtein. To evaluate the computational
efficiency of each of the string metrics in a practical setting, the time taken to perform
the join operation between the original dataset and the corrupted dataset was measured. We explored the impact on the performance when the number of characters
in names increases. In this case, the datasets always consisted of 10,000 records, but
the number of characters in each name was equal to 10, 15, or 20. These tests were
done on datasets with a record corruption of 10%, where the records were corrupted
using the Character Edit technique and contained one corruption per record. All
tests were performed on the same PC with Windows 10 OS and equipped with Intel
Core i7-4790K CPU running at 4.00GHz and 16GB of RAM. The results are shown in
Figure 4.3. The timing results of linkage performed on the other corrupted datasets
were very similar to the ones presented in this figure.
The results show that the q-grams approaches are very slightly faster than Jaro
in these tests, and significantly faster than Levenshtein. The average time taken to
perform the join operation on the datasets using Levenshtein was more than five
times the magnitude of the time taken by the other string metrics. Of course, the
best speed was observed when the datasets were linked using the Soundex metric.
In those cases the linkage was performed almost instantly, averaging only about one
second.
Additionally, we have investigated the impact on the performance when the num-
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ber of records increases. Three datasets of different volumes (10, 20, and 30 thousand
records) were linked to conduct the tests. The results shown in Figure 4.3 indicate
that as the number of records to be linked increases, the time required to link all the
records is again very similar for Jaro and the q-grams techniques, significantly greater
for Levenstein, and very low for Soundex.
Figure 4.3: The average time of record linkage using selected string metric techniques.
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4.1.6

Observation 6: As q increases, the record linkage quality degrades.

We also have studied the effects of the value of q on the accuracy of the q-grams
approach. As q increases, fewer q-grams are needed to encode a string. This implies
that every difference between two strings encoded using q-grams and compared using
the Dice or Jaccard coefficient will be penalized more and more as q increases. It
is therefore expected that performance will drop as q increases. Our goal was to
investigate the magnitude of this drop. We therefore studied the accuracy of the
q-grams approach for q equals 2, 3 and 4.
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As expected, bi-grams (q=2) yielded the best results for all types of datasets. Figure 4.4 presents the accuracy of record linkage of datasets containing keyboard errors
(10% of records were corrupted with one random insertion, deletion, substitution, or
transposition of a character). The records were linked based on Dice and Jaccard
coefficient scores. The solid lines represent the results of linking records using unpadded q-grams, the dotted lines indicate that the q-grams were padded. All versions
of q-grams demonstrated a very similar degradation pattern in linkage quality. For
example, when the records containing unpadded q-grams were linked based on Dice
coefficient scores with a threshold value set to 0.65 the percentages of successfully
linked records (that contained the aforementioned corruption) for q=2, 3, and 4 were
equal to 99%, 84%, and 57% respectively. This pattern holds for all types of dataset
corruptions (character, keyboard, OCR, or phonetic errors). When the number of
corruptions per record increases to two, the record linkage quality suffers even more.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the accuracy of record linkage of datasets where 10% of records
were corrupted with two random keyboard errors (Figures 4.4 and 4.5 were created
using the same color-coded series representing the linkage performed using the same
q-gram, padding, and q-gram similarity coefficient combination to allow easy comparison between the results). For low threshold values, the record linkage using q-grams
with q=4 resulted in correct linkage of only about 15% of corrupted records, and
even the usage of padded versions of q-grams didn’t significantly improve the results.
The linkage utilizing tri-grams and bi-grams performed 3 to 6 times better depending
on the particular combination of q value, padding, and q-gram similarity coefficient.
As before, the same linkage quality degradation pattern was reported for all types of
data corruption.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of accuracy of record linkage based on different types of qgrams. Linkage was performed on datasets corrupted with 1 Keyboard Edit.
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of accuracy of record linkage based on different types of qgrams. Linkage was performed on datasets
corrupted with 2 Keyboard Edits.
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4.2
4.2.1

Evaluation of Privacy Level of q -grams
q -grams Technique Privacy Vulnerabilities

An important measure of any PRL technique, in addition to its performance and scalability, is the level of privacy. In general, the PRL privacy requirements assume that
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once the record linkage is complete only limited amount of information will be shared
between interested parties. [Vatsalan et al. 2013] The ”limited amount” term usually
means revealing data such as: number of linked records, explicit identifiers of the
linked records, or linked records along with their selected attributes. The work presented here assumes that the querying entity can discover as much information about
the records in the database as it wishes. Here, the emphasis is instead on making
sure the records (more specifically the PII attributes) are always encrypted in order
to protect the identities of entities associated with records in case of potential data
breaches. For the q-grams based techniques, each of the q-grams was encrypted with
an AES password-based encryption algorithm. A brute force attack (i.e. dictionary
attack) on this kind of encryption algorithm has proven to be infeasible [Al Hasib and
Haque 2008]. However, as other researchers have noted, the q-gram based techniques
are prone to a frequency based attack. [Schnell et al. 2009; Churches and Christen
2004] A frequency attack can be mounted by comparing the frequency of each encrypted q-gram with its relative frequency derived from data that is likely to have a
similar distribution of q-gram occurrences. In the case of first and last names, such
data can be very easily found online. For example, a dataset that contains more than
5,000 first names and nearly 90,000 last names was published by U.S. Census Bureau
in 1990 [U.S. Census Bureau ]. To evaluate privacy level of q-gram based techniques
we want to answer the following question: What is the percentage of records whose
identities can be discovered by conducting a frequency based attack? This section
describes an overview of the approach taken to prepare the attack, and the following
sections present our findings and observations.

4.2.2

Frequency Attack Approach

The ultimate goal of the attack is to decrypt as many first and last names that are
stored in the form of encrypted q-grams as possible. When designing the attack the
following assumptions were made:
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• The attacker managed to obtain access to all encrypted records from the database,
along with all attributes of each record, but he/she doesn’t have access to their
unencrytped version.
• The attributes corresponding to first and last names can be identified by the
attacker. In other words, the attacker knows the schema of the record and can
identify which q-grams correspond to first name or last name. Additionally, the
q number used to form q-grams is also known.
• To fully explore the vulnerabilities of q-gram based techniques none of the names
(first or last) in the attacker’s dataset was corrupted since random errors in the
dataset could influence the results of the attack.
• Since the attacker can distinguish between q-grams corresponding to first name
or last name, the attack will be conducted on first and last names separately.
• The lists of first and last names published by the U.S. Census Bureau will be used
by the attacker to calculate relative frequencies of q-grams.
The simplest and most intuitive approach to conduct the frequency analysis attack
would be as follows. The attacker creates a list of encrypted q-grams containing the
frequency of occurrences of each of the q-grams. Using publicly available sources of
first and last names, the attacker can prepare similar lists with unencrypted versions
of the q-grams. Finally, the two lists can be ordered by the q-gram frequencies and
merged together in order to substitute the encrypted q-grams with their unencrypted
equivalents in all records from the database. However, such a naive approach will not
work. Since the attacker has no knowledge about the name distribution in the encrypted database, the two lists of q-gram frequencies are not likely to provide enough
correctly guessed q-gram decryptions to decrypt a significant number of names. Table
4.3 presents a selected part of the two lists created by analyzing q-gram frequencies
of first names, where the q number used to form the q-grams was equal to 2. Out
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of 323 encrypted q-grams there were only 8 matches where the nth q-gram from the
encrypted dataset had the exact same frequency rank as the q-gram derived from
the public dataset. A brute force solution to substitute every single possible decryption for each of the encrypted q-grams is not feasible. Such an attempt will result
in creating 3233 variations of q-gram decryptions. Evaluating each of the variations
would require too many computational resources. Therefore, it is clear that a more
sophisticated approach is needed.
Table 4.3: Top 10 most commonly occurring q-grams in encrypted and public datasets
of first names where q=2.
encrypted dataset

public dataset

q-gram

decrypted version

frequency

q-gram

frequency

1

BMNjNlgaU6MYKOYS7jEbcQ==

an

1769

an

819

2

WNd7LpS8QCJZQbxTI5CWnQ==

el

1086

ar

646

3

iWCuQ5xviCTYO6B+LGBLDA==

li

1002

el

639

4

LuzDuWRkbEwZK8xmRqA49A==

le

972

ri

530

5

tJIjS5UyZTKCiw3XkEYQMg==

ia

942

na

498

6

TEdzDzlf+TzuFA4+wrJ3og==

ar

924

le

494

7

9pHgQ2qQC1XGJ4u8SKZDmQ==

la

838

in

491

8

Tbm4IHyAi7hwjB2sZAL6ag==

na

799

ne

488

9

TvNEdMt1kMGkccoSPJzeMA==

ha

764

en

473

10

+Sbh5wED8+a/lMhao3C6GQ==

en

744

er

467

To conduct the frequency attack in an efficient manner we decided to take an
advantage of the fact that the frequencies of q-grams derived from the public dataset
are usually not too far off from the frequencies of the encrypted q-grams. For example,
the encrypted q-gram ”ar” in Table 4.3 was classified as the 6th most frequent in the
encrypted database and as the 2nd most frequent among q-grams derived from the
public dataset of names. This information can significantly reduce the number of
possible decryption variations for the encrypted q-grams. To reduce it even further,
we propose the following technique that analyzes each of the encrypted records and
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identifies the most probable q-gram translation.
Once a table similar to the one present in Table 4.3 is obtained, the attacker
iterates through each of the encrypted records. Based on the assumption that the q
number is known to the attacker, the length of the encrypted name can be deduced
using the formula: L = n + q − 1, where L is the length of the name, n is the number
of q-grams used to form the name and q is the q number. The length of the name
is used to pull all instances of names from the publicly available dataset of the same
length. Those names will serve as guesses of the encrypted name. It is likely that the
number of names of length L will be in the hundreds or even thousands. To reduce
this number, in the next step the attacker prepares another table with the number of
rows equal to the number of encrypted q-grams in the record. Each row contains an
encrypted q-gram and a list of potential translations of this q-gram obtained from a
table such as Table 4.3. The list is populated with the q-gram translation that matches
the frequency rank of the encrypted q-gram as well as additional q-gram translations
that are within a specified range (later on referred to as the ”Guessing Offset”) above
and below the frequency matching q-gram. An example of such table is presented
in Table 4.5, where each possible q-gram translation includes the information about
the offset between a translation itself and the translation that matches the frequency
of the encrypted q-gram. The offset represents how close the frequency rank of a
potential q-gram translation is to that of the frequency of the encrypted q-gram. For
example, the second encrypted q-gram in Table 4.5 ”TEdzDzlf+TzuFA4+wrJ3og==”
includes possible translations such as ”le:0”. ”le” is the translation that matches
the frequency rank of the encrypted q-gram (see Table 4.3), so there is no offset.
Another possible translation ”ar:4” indicates that the q-gram ”ar” has an offset of
4 between ”ar” and the q-gram that matches the frequency rank of the encrypted
q-gram (”le”). This table is used to eliminate the guesses of the encrypted name that
are not valid due to the fact that they cannot be formed given the lists of possible
q-gram translations for each of the encrypted q-grams. For example, in Table 4.5,
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the possible q-gram translation “ri” can be eliminated from the second row because
none of the possibilities in the first row end with “r”. The corresponding list of
possible guesses for the encrypted name can then be further reduced. In the final
step, each of the names in the guesses list is assigned a penalty score. The score
is the sum of the offsets that had to be taken to include all q-grams used to form
the name. Based on Table 4.5, a name ”tere” would receive the penalty score of 1
(”te:1”) + 4 (”er:4”) + 2 (”re:2”) = 7. The name with the lowest score is identified
as the best possible guess for the encrypted name. The q-grams used to form this
guess are stored in a separate table (called the Translation Table) that contains the
encrypted q-grams and their corresponding translations obtained from the name with
the lowest penalty score. When the attacker is done iterating through all of the
encrypted records, the translation for an encrypted q-gram is identified by taking
its most common translation from the Translation Table. The attacker can now
substitute the encrypted q-grams with their unencrypted versions in all encrypted
names in the dataset.
We now provide an example iteration of the frequency attack approach described
above. Table 4.4 illustrates one of the encrypted records that the attacker obtained
from the database during the security breach. The attribute called ’First Name’
represents a set of encrypted q-grams separated by commas that were used to encrypt
the name ”sara”. The attacker can infer the length of the name behind the encrypted
Table 4.4: An example of an encrypted record.
Record Id
rec-1081

First Name
uSpcZZ71KiNrD8Av/FS3cA==,

....
....

TEdzDzlf+TzuFA4+wrJ3og==, 2gP9jD8Zg5ugC6YTQg3UMQ==

q-grams by applying the following formula: length = 3 + (2 − 1) = 4 since he knows
that the q number is equal to 2. From a publicly available dataset of names, he or
she can obtain the list of all names of length 4: john, hera, sara, carl ,tera, tere, etc.
to serve as the guesses list. To trim the list, a Table 4.5 is prepared where each of
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the encrypted q-grams has a list of its potential decryptions obtained from a table
similar to Table 4.3. Assume that the maximum ”guessing offset” is equal to 5 (i.e.
each q-gram translation no further than 5 places up or down the list is considered
similar). Based on Table 4.5 the attacker can eliminate most of the names from the
Table 4.5: Lists of possible translations for encrypted q-grams used to encrypt the
name ”sara”
encrypted q-gram

possible translations (q-gram:offset)

uSpcZZ71KiNrD8Av/FS3cA==

nd:5,il:4,de:3,ro:2,te:1,he:0,mi:1,sa:2,th:3,st:4,tt:5

TEdzDzlf+TzuFA4+wrJ3og==

an:5,ar:4,el:3,ri:2,na:1,le:0,in:1,ne:2,en:3,er:4,la:5

2gP9jD8Zg5ugC6YTQg3UMQ==

li:5,ie:4,ma:3,ha:2,on:1,ra:0,ia:1,re:2,da:3,ta:4,al:5

guesses list. For example, the name ”john” is not a valid option because there is
no ”jo” q-gram as a possible translation for the first encrypted q-gram. The only
names that are left are: tera, tere, hera, and sara. Each of the names is assigned a
penalty score that is the sum of the offset associated with each q-gram required to
form a particular name in the list of possible translations. For example, the name
tera (te:1, er:4, ra:0) will be assigned a score of 5. The name with the lowest score,
which in this example is hera (score of 4), will be considered the correct translation
of the encrypted name. The attacker will keep the corresponding q-gram translations
in the separate table (see Table 4.6). Once all records have been processed by the
Table 4.6: List of encrypted q-gram translations after one iteration
encrypted q-gram

possible translation (q-gram:occurrences)

uSpcZZ71KiNrD8Av/FS3cA==

he: 1

TEdzDzlf+TzuFA4+wrJ3og==

er: 1

2gP9jD8Zg5ugC6YTQg3UMQ==

ra:1

attacker, the translation for an encrypted q-gram will be selected from Table 4.6. If
there is more than one option for the translation, the one with the higher number of
occurrences will be considered the correct one.
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Observations on Frequency Attack Analysis

The frequency attack was conducted on a dataset containing 10,000 records. Each
record included two sets of encrypted q-grams: one set corresponding to the q-grams
that represented a first name and another one corresponding to a last name. To
study the effectiveness of the attack on different type of q-grams, four variations of
the dataset were generated, each using a different value for q, from 1 to 4. The attack
was carried out on first and last names separately. This section provides an overview
of our most important findings.
4.2.3.1

Observation 7: Security increases as q increases (with one exception)

To convey the results of the frequency analysis attack, we present three figures that
illustrate the key statistics. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of names that were fully
decrypted. In the case in which the dataset of first names were encoded with unigrams
(i.e. q-grams with q equal to 1) we were able to correctly decrypt 66% (about 550
names) of all first names in the database (blue solid line). When first names are
encrypted with q equal to 2 (the solid orange line), only about 14% of names were
successfully decrypted. For q equal to 3 and 4, the percentage of decrytped names
drops near zero. The pattern for last names is similar, with the exception of when q
equals 1, which will be discussed shortly. When q equals 2, 28% of last names were
fully decrypted, but when q equals 3 or 4, this value never reaches 2%.
The performance degradation can be explained by looking at the number of unique
q-grams in the dataset as q increases. Table 4.7 provides detailed information regarding the exact number of unique q-grams in each dataset. For instance, with q equal
to 2 there are 323 unique q-grams in the case of first names, and 644 in the case of
last names. When q is equal to 4 the number of unique q-grams increases to 1757
and 15146 respectively. With higher values of q the chance of identifying a correct
translation for an encrypted q-gram is smaller, and the potential attacker would likely
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have to conduct a brute force attack to decrypt a significant number of names.
Figure 4.6: The percentage of decrypted first and last names for different values of q.
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The reason the frequency analysis attack was unsuccessful when q equaled 3 or 4
is because our benchmark dataset of 10,000 records didn’t contain enough samples of
many q-gram to decrypt them. Some of the q-grams occurred only a few times across
all of the records, making the q-gram distribution very uniform. The proper way to
attack a dataset with this kind of distribution is a brute force attack (i.e. substituting
every single possible q-gram translation for each of the encrypted q-grams). Such an
attack would require a very high amount of computational resources. For instance, the
number of unique q-grams for our dataset of last names when q=4 is equal to 15,146.
This results in more than 230 million possible combinations of q-gram substitutions.
Fully decrypted names are not the only ones the attacker might be interested in.
A name that is partially decrypted, for example where eight out of ten q-grams were
correctly decrypted, might also have a high value to the attacker. Figure 4.7 presents
the average rate of decryption of first and last names. We define the rate of decryption
as the percentage of correctly decrypted q-grams in a name. In the aforementioned
example, correct decryption of eight out of ten q-grams equates to an 80% rate of
decryption. By looking at the series in Figure 4.7, one can see that the average rates
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Table 4.7: Number of unique q-grams in datasets of first and last names.
number of unique q-grams in dataset of
q number

first names

last names

1

28

29

2

323

644

3

1256

5378

4

1757

15146

of decryption for both first and last names are similar for corresponding q values. The
maximum average rates of decryption for first and last names are very high for q=1
and q=2: 93% and 63% for first names, and 62% and 77% for last names. Partially
decrypted names might be easy to guess and can provide a huge aid in discovering
decrypted values of encrypted q-grams, which may consequently lead to discovering
the identity of all entities in the encrypted database.
Figure 4.7: The average rate of decryption of first and last names for different values
of q.
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Observation 8: The Guessing Offset must be increased as q increases, making the attack more expensive

Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of correctly decrypted q-grams out of all of the qgrams used to form first or last names as a function of the Guessing Offset. With q=1
the decryption percentage increases very quickly even for low ranges of the Guessing
Offset. It is worth noting that in the case of q=1 and Guessing Offset greater than
20, the q-gram decryption percentage is at its highest (63% and 83% for first and last
names respectively). The reason it never reaches 100% is because of the nature of the
frequency analysis attack we took. Some of the q-grams occur so rarely (or very evenly
when compared to others) that their potential translations result in too many possible
options and they are never identified correctly. This could possibly be improved by
using a different source of names (i.e. other than ones coming from the U.S. Census
Bureau). The series for q=2 reach their maximum with the Guessing Offset greater
than 160 (not shown on the graph). Presumably, the series that correspond to q equal
to 3 and 4 would eventually also reached their maximum, though at an impractically
high Guessing Offset. Another interesting observation that can be made by analyzing
the data in Figure 4.8 is that the q-gram decryption ratio is not consistent with
the percentage of fully or partially decrypted names. For example, with the q-gram
decryption rate between 30% and 40% for q=1, we were able to fully decrypt only 2%
of last and 1% of first names, and achieve a 36% and 56% average rate of decryption.
For the same q-gram decryption rate for q=2, the numbers increase to 23%, 9%, 75%,
and 56% respectively. As the q number increases from 1 to 2 the distribution of the
q-grams becomes less uniform, which makes it easier to identify q-grams required to
decrypt (or partially decrypt) a significant number of names.
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Figure 4.8: The rate of q-gram decryption for first and last names encoded with
different values of q.
90

Number of decrypted q-grams (in %)

80

70

first names, q=1

60

first names, q=2
50

first names, q=3
first names, q=4

40

last names, q=1
last names, q=2

30

last names, q=3
20

last names, q=4

10

0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Guessing Offset

4.2.3.3

Observation 9: Some name collections are more vulnerable than
others

The exception mentioned in section 4.2.3.1 occurs when the q-gram approach with q
equal to one is used to protect the collection of last names. In this case the dataset is
surprisingly resilient to a frequency analysis attack. Based on Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8
the percentage of decrypted last names should be relatively close to the percentage
of decrypted first names. The percentages of decrypted q-grams occuring in first and
last names when q=1 were equal to 83% and 63% respectively, and the average rates
of first and last name decryption were equal to 93% ad 62%. Yet, only 4% of last
names were fully decrypted, compared to 66% of first names. The surprisingly low
percentage of fully decrypted last names can be explained by two properties of the
datasets of first and last names that were used to conduct the frequency analysis
attack. Firstly, the average length of a first name is shorter by 1.5054 characters
than the average length of a last name. Shorter length means that fewer q-grams are
required to fully decrypt a name. Additionally, Figure 4.9 shows that more than 40%
of all last names are longer than eight characters, while 40% of all first names contain
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fewer than six characters.
Figure 4.9: First and last name distribution based on the length of the name.
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Another property that makes the last names harder to decrypt is a more uniform
unigram distribution across all of the records. The distributions are shown in Figure
4.10. The less uniformly q-grams are distributed, the easier it is to guess their correct decryption. In the case of first names, the two most frequent unigrams can be
clearly identified (’a’ and ’e’). In case of last names, ’a’ and ’e’ have almost identical
frequency. Moreover, the second most frequent unigram in last names is also hard to
select because unigrams ’i’, ’l’, ’n’, ’o’, ’r’, and ’s’ have very similar frequency of occurrence. These two properties have a strong influence on the number of successfully
decrypted q-grams.
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Figure 4.10: First and last names distribution based on the length of the name.
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5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1

Summary of Comparison Study

In this work we evaluated the accuracy and speed of selected string metrics that support approximate matching for querying and joining databases based on encrypted
names. An advanced benchmark generation tool, “GeCo”, was used to produce sample datasets with records containing common mistakes in name spelling such as typographical errors, optical recognition errors, and phonetic errors. The performance
of several string metrics that support approximate matching on encrypted data (four
variations of q-grams based techniques and one technique based on encodings produced by the Soundex algorithm), was compared against commonly used string metrics, such as Jaro and Levenshtein, employed on unencrypted data.
Joining databases based on Soundex encodings did not prove to be a feasible
option since it failed to find a correct match for more than 50% of records when the
name in a corrupted record contained one error, and for almost 75% when corrupted
records could contain two errors in a single name. Q-grams based techniques seem to
be viable option for joining databases on encrypted names. While their performance
in terms of precision is slightly worse than the performance of metrics such as Jaro
or Levenshtein on unencrypted data, this can be easily dealt with by adjusting the
threshold value that determines when two q-grams are likely to correspond to the
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same name.
The privacy level of the q-grams based technique was also evaluated. We proved
that in the event of a data breach the attacker might launch a successful frequency
analysis based attack against the database containing encrypted q-grams under certain conditions. The databases encrypted using q-grams where q=1 or 2 turned out to
be vulnerable to the attack, while the databases encrypted with q-grams where q=3
or 4 were resilient to the attack. Therefore, in order to achieve acceptable privacy
while maintaining a reasonable level of performance, q should be set at least three.
Since the usage of q-grams with q set to two offers better performance in terms of
accuracy we provide a list of suggestions that the database provider might follow to
make the frequency analysis attack more time consuming:
• Keeping the q-gram distribution in the database as uniform as possible. This can
be achieved in two ways. The insertion of new records happens only if the q-gram
distribution can be kept at the same uniform level after the insertion. Another
approach would be to force the database holder to populate the database with
dummy record when a new record is inserted, so that the q-gram distribution is
maintained at the same uniform level at all times. Both approaches have their
advantages and disadvantages. The first will make the database more resilient to
the attack but it might limit, or sometimes even block, the update capabilities of
the database. The latter can keep the q-gram distribution at the same level at all
times but it might degrade the quality of data by inserting dummy records.
• In our attack scenario we assumed that q-grams in each record were stored in
the corrected order (i.e. name “sara” was stored as sequence of “sa”, “ar”, “a”).
Similarity string metrics such as Dice or Jaccard don’t take into account the order
of q-grams in the record. Therefore, the q-grams could be randomly shuffled in
order to make the decryption process harder. At the same time, the performance
of calculating q-grams similarity in terms of accuracy will not suffer.
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Future Work

In future work we plan to extend the range of attribute types that can be used to
perform record linkage. In this study we focused on linking records based only on an
individual’s first and last name. However other types of attributes, such as numeric
or categorical ones, can also carry PII. We want to be able to integrate those kind of
attributes into private record linkage queries within our targeted application scenario.
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